By Roza Nurgozhayeva
As international institutions continue to wrestle with the politics of climate change and adaptation, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has emerged as both a development strategy and a test case for global sustainability governance. Positioned as a champion of the Global South, China has framed the BRI as a platform for inclusive growth and green transformation. But how well does this vision align with reality on the ground?
In my article, “The Belt and Road Initiative and Sustainability: A Driving Force for Change and a Missed Opportunity?” (Chinese Journal of Environmental Law) and a book chapter “Climate Governance as a Test Case for Chinese Developmentalism: From Ambition to Accountability” (forthcoming in Matthew S. Erie & Jacques deLisle (Eds.), China in the World Law & Political Economy, CUP), I examine the BRI’s normative role in climate governance and the way it operates in practice.
China’s Climate Leadership: The Scale and Stakes
The BRI spans more than 150 countries, representing half of global energy consumption, three-quarters of the world’s population, and half of the global GDP. That scale carries weight: if these countries continue carbon-heavy growth, it could lead to a near 3°C temperature rise, even if the rest of the world meets the 2°C goal. By 2050, BRI states could account for two-thirds of all global carbon emissions.
This trajectory raises a critical question: Can the BRI become a genuine force for sustainability, or is it reinforcing old patterns under a new name?
Green Promises, Uneven Reality
On paper, China’s “Green BRI” strategy pledges to embed environmental protection into all areas of cooperation—from trade and investment to culture and infrastructure. Beijing has issued numerous guidelines promoting ecological civilization and green development as part of the BRI.
Yet the gap between China’s green rhetoric and on-the-ground results remains wide. Many BRI projects continue to support fossil fuel industries or other carbon-intensive sectors. One of the root issues is structural: the BRI operates as a voluntary, non-binding platform. Unlike traditional multilateral frameworks, the BRI has no formal membership or treaty architecture. It operates through bilateral agreements and projects that adhere to national sovereignty, particularly in regulatory matters. Environmental and social protections are governed primarily by “host country standards.”
In practice, this approach means that project oversight and climate safeguards depend on the legal and institutional strength of the recipient country. Many BRI host nations, particularly in the Global South, face well-known governance challenges and limited enforcement capacity. As a result, Chinese companies operating abroad often comply only with the minimum local requirements, even if these fall short of international sustainability norms or Chinese domestic standards.
This decentralized model aligns with China’s broader developmentalist strategy, which favors flexibility, pragmatism, and mutual benefit. But it also creates serious accountability gaps, particularly for large-scale, high-emissions infrastructure projects.
Case Study: Kazakhstan at the Crossroads
Kazakhstan offers a telling example. The country remains China’s most prominent BRI partner in Central Asia and has received over two-thirds of all BRI investments in the region. While the country has set ambitious targets, including carbon neutrality by 2060 and updated environmental laws, renewable energy still attracts just 2% of foreign investment. The economy remains heavily tied to fossil fuel exports, which account for more than 70% of government revenue.
Despite legal reforms, implementation has lagged. Public participation is limited, and many projects fall outside public scrutiny. Chinese investments—often structured through private project-specific companies—frequently avoid transparency requirements and accountability. This legal design enables “emissions outsourcing” and further widens the implementation gap between Green BRI principles and practice.
Policy Recommendations
There are clear steps to enhance the Green BRI’s effectiveness:
1. Establish uniform environmental standards that apply to all BRI projects, regardless of domestic law.
2. Implement independent climate impact assessments for infrastructure investments.
3. Support institutional capacity in host countries, including public participation rights and access to environmental data.
The BRI’s global reach gives it unmatched influence. But with that comes responsibility. It is not enough for China to promote green narratives. It must embed them in law, institutions, and practice. Whether the BRI becomes a force for sustainability or a missed opportunity will depend on how China—and its partners—navigate the space between aspiration and accountability.
Read the complete article
As international institutions continue to wrestle with the politics of climate change and adaptation, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has emerged as both a development strategy and a test case for global sustainability governance. Positioned as a champion of the Global South, China has framed the BRI as a platform for inclusive growth and green transformation. But how well does this vision align with reality on the ground?
In my article, “The Belt and Road Initiative and Sustainability: A Driving Force for Change and a Missed Opportunity?” (Chinese Journal of Environmental Law) and a book chapter “Climate Governance as a Test Case for Chinese Developmentalism: From Ambition to Accountability” (forthcoming in Matthew S. Erie & Jacques deLisle (Eds.), China in the World Law & Political Economy, CUP), I examine the BRI’s normative role in climate governance and the way it operates in practice.
China’s Climate Leadership: The Scale and Stakes
The BRI spans more than 150 countries, representing half of global energy consumption, three-quarters of the world’s population, and half of the global GDP. That scale carries weight: if these countries continue carbon-heavy growth, it could lead to a near 3°C temperature rise, even if the rest of the world meets the 2°C goal. By 2050, BRI states could account for two-thirds of all global carbon emissions.
This trajectory raises a critical question: Can the BRI become a genuine force for sustainability, or is it reinforcing old patterns under a new name?
Green Promises, Uneven Reality
On paper, China’s “Green BRI” strategy pledges to embed environmental protection into all areas of cooperation—from trade and investment to culture and infrastructure. Beijing has issued numerous guidelines promoting ecological civilization and green development as part of the BRI.
Yet the gap between China’s green rhetoric and on-the-ground results remains wide. Many BRI projects continue to support fossil fuel industries or other carbon-intensive sectors. One of the root issues is structural: the BRI operates as a voluntary, non-binding platform. Unlike traditional multilateral frameworks, the BRI has no formal membership or treaty architecture. It operates through bilateral agreements and projects that adhere to national sovereignty, particularly in regulatory matters. Environmental and social protections are governed primarily by “host country standards.”
In practice, this approach means that project oversight and climate safeguards depend on the legal and institutional strength of the recipient country. Many BRI host nations, particularly in the Global South, face well-known governance challenges and limited enforcement capacity. As a result, Chinese companies operating abroad often comply only with the minimum local requirements, even if these fall short of international sustainability norms or Chinese domestic standards.
This decentralized model aligns with China’s broader developmentalist strategy, which favors flexibility, pragmatism, and mutual benefit. But it also creates serious accountability gaps, particularly for large-scale, high-emissions infrastructure projects.
Case Study: Kazakhstan at the Crossroads
Kazakhstan offers a telling example. The country remains China’s most prominent BRI partner in Central Asia and has received over two-thirds of all BRI investments in the region. While the country has set ambitious targets, including carbon neutrality by 2060 and updated environmental laws, renewable energy still attracts just 2% of foreign investment. The economy remains heavily tied to fossil fuel exports, which account for more than 70% of government revenue.
Despite legal reforms, implementation has lagged. Public participation is limited, and many projects fall outside public scrutiny. Chinese investments—often structured through private project-specific companies—frequently avoid transparency requirements and accountability. This legal design enables “emissions outsourcing” and further widens the implementation gap between Green BRI principles and practice.
Policy Recommendations
There are clear steps to enhance the Green BRI’s effectiveness:
1. Establish uniform environmental standards that apply to all BRI projects, regardless of domestic law.
2. Implement independent climate impact assessments for infrastructure investments.
3. Support institutional capacity in host countries, including public participation rights and access to environmental data.
The BRI’s global reach gives it unmatched influence. But with that comes responsibility. It is not enough for China to promote green narratives. It must embed them in law, institutions, and practice. Whether the BRI becomes a force for sustainability or a missed opportunity will depend on how China—and its partners—navigate the space between aspiration and accountability.
Read the complete article